Determinants of debt rescheduling in Eastern European countries by Laušev, J. et al.
Laušev, J., Stojanovic, A. & Todorovic, N. (2011). Determinants of debt rescheduling in Eastern 
European countries. Economic Annals, 56(188), pp. 7-31. doi: 10.2298/EKA1188007L 
City Research Online
Original citation: Laušev, J., Stojanovic, A. & Todorovic, N. (2011). Determinants of debt 
rescheduling in Eastern European countries. Economic Annals, 56(188), pp. 7-31. doi: 
10.2298/EKA1188007L 
Permanent City Research Online URL: http://openaccess.city.ac.uk/7692/
 
Copyright & reuse
City University London has developed City Research Online so that its users may access the 
research outputs of City University London's staff. Copyright © and Moral Rights for this paper are 
retained by the individual author(s) and/ or other copyright holders.  All material in City Research 
Online is checked for eligibility for copyright before being made available in the live archive. URLs 
from City Research Online may be freely distributed and linked to from other web pages. 
Versions of research
The version in City Research Online may differ from the final published version. Users are advised 
to check the Permanent City Research Online URL above for the status of the paper.
Enquiries
If you have any enquiries about any aspect of City Research Online, or if you wish to make contact 
with the author(s) of this paper, please email the team at publications@city.ac.uk.
1 
 
DETERMINANTS OF DEBT RESCHEDULING IN EASTERN 
EUROPEAN COUNTRIES 
 
Jelena Lausev1, Aleksandar Stojanovic2 and Natasa Todorovic3 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
This study utilizes Panel Logit Models applied to a set of macroeconomic, financial and 
political variables to estimate debt rescheduling probabilities of 15 Eastern European 
countries during the transition period from 1990-2005 . These transition economies became a 
very attractive region for foreign investments. Specifically, the region became the largest 
recipient of net non-FDI flows among all emerging market regions in 2005.  Therefore, it is 
relevant for policy makers, institutional and private foreign investors to investigate factors 
that influence debt rescheduling probabilities, as these may directly affect the size of and the 
return on the investments in these countries. Our findins suggest that the policy efforts 
focused at reducing government expenditures, attracting foreign direct investments, 
increasing export revenues and keeping a good repayment record  result in low debt 
recheduling probabilities and, in turn, decrease the cost of debt for these countries. This is the 
common finding for all countries in the sample, including those that became EU members.  
 
Key words: Country Debt, Rescheduling, Eastern Europe, Transition, Panel Logit Model  
JEL Classification : F33, F34 
                                                             
1
 Faculty of Economics, University of Belgrade, Kamenicka 6, 11000 Belgrade,Serbia 
2
 Univesity of Greenwich Business School,  Old Royal Naval College, Park Row, London SE10 9LS, UK 
3
 Corresponding author: Cass Business School, 106 Bunhill Row, London EC1Y 8TZ, UK;  
email: n.todorovic@city.ac.uk 
 
  
2 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
All major international investors and banks use sovereign debt default rates to price sovereign 
bonds and loans as well as to determine a country risk. Furthermore, in recent years many 
developing countries have negotiated new loan repayment schedules with their government 
and commercial bank lenders. The aim of this study is to specify a model which would allow 
prediction of sovereign default/rescheduling rates with a higher accuracy, particularly tailored 
for the investors interested in the Eastern Europe (EE) region. 
 
The group of 15 EE countries used in this study share similarities in respect of the social, 
political, geographical, economic and cultural characteristics. Most of the recent studies of 
sovereign debt problems looked at the middle income countries of Latin America, Asia or 
Africa, but none of them paid special attention to emerging markets of Eastern Europe, and 
the period of their transition to market economies. Several earlier studies include data for 
some of these countries in their multi country data set, however, due to specific common 
characteristics of EE countries, it is questionable whether conclusions from previous studies 
looking at all emerging markets can be directly applied to EE countries.  Therefore, this paper 
will focus on EE countries as the very first attempt to model debt rescheduling probabilities 
for this region.  
 
This paper aims to answer the following questions: (1) What are the most important 
determinants of EE sovereign debt rescheduling? (2) How accurately those determinants 
predict sovereign debt rescheduling? (3) How to specify a model that would allow prediction 
of EE sovereign rescheduling with a higher accuracy? Answers to these questions could be 
used to derive implications for policy makers and potential creditors and investors in the 
region.  
 
The countries included in the study are: Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, 
Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Poland, Romania, Russian 
Federation, Serbia, Montenegro and Slovak Republic. The regions’ debt rescheduling 
probabilities are tested for the effects of wide range of macroeconomic, financial and political 
indicators.  
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2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
Series of financial crises and defaults starting from the late 1970s and early 1980s period (see 
e.g. Camdessus, 1986 and Cuddington and Smith, 1985), and later incidents culminating in 
Argentina’s default in 2001, prompted an intense debate about how to prevent crises. As 
pointed out by Manasse, Roubini and Schimmelpfennig (2003) the literature on debt crisis 
falls into four broad categories: theoretical models of sovereign default, empirical studies of 
the determinants of debt crisis, empirical studies of the predictive power of credit ratings and 
empirical studies of the determination of spreads. Given the aims of our study, the literature 
we review is focused on the determinants of debt rescheduling and the models used to predict 
it.  
 
One of the earlier studies by Frank and Cline (1971) applied discriminate analysis to show 
that it is possible to obtain a very high prediction rate using only two factors, the debt service 
ratio and the average maturity of debt. Among the first studies using logit analysis were Feder 
and Just (1976) followed by Feder, Just and Ross (1981) and Feder and Uy (1984). The 
authors point out that the analysis of the growth record of many economies indicates that 
foreign capital is an important factor in the process of economic development. Eaton and 
Gersovitz (1981) developed a model of borrowing with default, showing that lenders 
establish debt ceilings above which they are unwilling to increase loans. Further, McFaden et 
al. (1985) estimate crisis probabilities using data on 93 countries from 1970-1982, concluding 
that although an econometric model can help to explain sovereign debt problems, it is 
extremely difficult to develop an early warning system that would predict debt crises in 
advance as countries may experience heterogeneous repayment problems. They find that the 
debt burden, the level of per capita income, real GDP growth, and liquidity measures such as 
non-gold reserves are significant predictors of debt crisis, while the changes in real exchange 
rates are not. 
 
In most of the empirical studies two groups of main variables were constantly included in 
econometric analyses: short-term or liquidity factors (also known as traditional debt or 
financial ratios: debt/GDP, reserves/imports and debt service/export) and long term variables 
(GDP growth, investments, inflation). For example, Manasse, Roubini and Schimmelpfennig 
(2003) find solvency problems measured through high total external debt to GDP ratio and 
liquidity problems measured through short term debt to be highly associated with the debt 
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rescheduling. Hemming and Petrie (2000) present a discussion on fiscal sustainability and 
develop vulnerability indicators. Hemming and Chalk (2000) for the first time systematically 
examine the link between fiscal and external sustainability. Furthermore, Detragiache and 
Spilimbergo (2001) study the importance of liquidity factors such as short-term debt, debt 
service, and the level of international reserves in predicting debt crises, and find that less 
liquid countries are more likely to default. Additionally, they find that countries that are more 
open are in a better position to service debt and that overvalued exchange rate hurts the future 
export performance of the country.   
 
Krugman (1987) built theoretical model that highlights the importance of “debt overhang” of 
the developing nations and derive policy implications about the desirability of forgiving or 
refinancing such debt. Berg and Sachs (1988) found that higher income inequality is a 
significant predictor of a higher probability of debt rescheduling in the middle income 
countries. Also, the open trade regime is a significant predictor of a reduced probability of 
debt rescheduling. As they pointed out, earlier studies, such as McFadden et al. (1985), 
identify variables that are more the symptoms of the crises rather than their fundamental 
causes.  
 
Political risk and institutional variables are also found to play a key role in determining debt 
rescheduling among emerging markets countries. Balkan (1992) was the first to find an 
inverse relationship between rescheduling probabilities for one country and its level of 
democracy, as well as a direct relationship between probability of rescheduling and political 
instability. More recent evidence of the significance of political variable can be found in 
Haque, Nelson and Mathieson (1998). Brewer and Rivoli (1997) showed that the inclusion of 
political variables into forecasting models improves the correct prediction rate of 
rescheduling probability by nine to twelve percent for the earlier periods and 18 to 35 percent 
for later periods. Citron and Nickelsburg (1986) point out that the political variable is in fact 
a non diversifiable risk and identify waves of default which tend to occur in approximately 
thirty year cycles and typically involve many countries. Georgievska et al. (2009) confirm the 
importance of political factors in determining debt rescheduling probabilities in emerging 
markets. Kraay and Nehru (2004) were the first to point that quality of institutions and 
policies has a key impact on rescheduling. Further, Butler and Fauver (2006) found that the 
quality of a country’s legal and political institutions play a vital role in determining sovereign 
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credit ratings. Reinhart and Rogoff (2004) find that the flows of capital from rich countries to 
poor countries are largely governed by sovereign default probabilities.  
 
A number of studies is also assessing the impact of past debt repayment record on the future 
rescheduling. For example, Carmen (1992), McFadden et al (1985) and Aylward and Thorne 
(1998) find that the poor debt repayment history is a strong indicator of future problems.   
 
Ciarlone and Trebeschi (2005) use financial market data to analyze the behavior of CDSs 
spreads. Schwartz and Zurita (1992) develop a model which determines the optimal amount 
of debt to borrow based on the production possibilities of the country, time preferences and 
the risk free interest rate. The study also gives the optimal level of debt default penalty: the 
higher the penalty that can be imposed on the country in the event of default the lower the 
probability of default but higher the problem of underinvestment. These arguments are 
relevant for considering possible new debt authorization to the countries of Eastern Europe. 
 
2.1. EE Countries’ Recent Economic Position  
The European Central Bank considers investing in EE countries during the transition period 
as potentially problematic due to two main reasons4:  1) credit growth can affect financial 
stability and financing ‘bad’ projects will eventually turn into bad debt or result in a build-up 
of large external debt, and 2) policymakers and market participants need to assess and 
monitor credit growth developments as in the past they have been associated with the 
emergence of financial and currency crises. 
 
In the early years of the transition, most EE countries experienced a significant slump in 
GDP, which was followed by a period of rapid economic growth. In some cases, rapid 
privatization of the banking sector and expansion of underdeveloped financial markets 
resulted in lending booms followed by credit crunches and crises that spilled over to the 
region as a whole. Hoti (2005), for example, analyses country-specific and regional 1) 
economic, 2) financial, 3) political and 4) composite risk factors for six Balkan countries and 
documents significant country spill-over effects. 
 
                                                             
4
 Financial Stability Rewiew, ECB 2006 
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Eastern Europe is the only emerging market region with systematic current account deficits in 
2005-2006. According to Roubini and Menegatti (2006) countries that have large current 
account deficits above four per cent of GDP are: Lithuania, Hungary, and Slovakia while 
Schafer (2006) reports that Estonia and Latvia have current account deficits even above ten 
per cent which makes these countries similar to Romania, Bulgaria, Croatia, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina and region of Serbia and Montenegro. At the same time some of these countries 
are recording high lending growth since most of them finance current account deficits by 
FDI. Most of the other emerging markets in Asia and Latin America are running current 
account surpluses. Since many previous episodes of financial crisis in emerging market 
economies have been associated, among other factors, with large current account deficits it is 
important to examine EE group of countries separately.   
 
The average growth rate of credit in 2001-2005 period has been very high in all countries in 
our sample but Poland, Czech Republic and Slovakia (see Egert et al. (2006), Kiss and Nagy 
(2006), Coricelli et al. (2006), European Commission (2006), ECB Financial Stability 
Review (2006) and World Bank Regular Economic Report (2007)). In addition, Hungary 
observed asset bubbles in equity and housing markets. Schafer (2006) indicates that these 
countries’ economic boom is financed by foreign lending and concludes that it may lead to 
financial crisis.  
 
World Economic Outlook (2006) reports that the region’s generally large current account 
deficits partly reflects favorable investment opportunities in EE region. In some countries 
capital inflows were associated not just with private sector financial imbalances but also with 
substantial fiscal imbalances (e.g. Hungary, Poland and Slovakia). However, WEO (2006) 
stresses that the large net capital inflows are increasing not in the form of FDIs but rather in 
the form of other (more volatile) flows, including short-term debt. Specifically, the EE region 
became the largest recipient of net non-FDI flows among all emerging market regions in 
2005. This has implications for policymakers and potential investors who need to examine 
the trade off between the sovereign capacities and the risks involved. 
 
Roubini and Menegatti (2006) distinguish between solvency and liquidity variables in EE 
region, which are also potential determinants of sovereign debt rescheduling. This study 
reports high and rising levels of external debt as a share of GDP, especially for Hungary, 
Croatia, Slovenia, Latvia, Estonia and debt to export ratio for Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, 
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Poland, Slovenia, Croatia, and Romania. Liquidity risk measured as a share of money in 
foreign exchange reserves (M2/FX ratio) is well above one for all countries in the sample of 
this study. In addition, short term debt/FX ratio is rising in Hungary, Croatia, Lithuania, 
Latvia and Estonia.  Gross external financing needs (measured as short term debt plus current 
account deficit as a share of foreign exchange reserves) are greater than one also for all 
countries. Public sector vulnerabilities are presented through share of foreign currency public 
debt in total debt which is greater than 50% in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Croatia, Bulgaria, 
Romania and Bosnia-Herzegovina. The share of short term public debt in total debt is high 
(above 30%) in Czech Republic and Poland and medium (20-30%) in Hungary, Croatia, 
Lithuania and Slovakia.  Public debt to GDP ratio is high (above 50%) only in Hungary and 
Bosnia-Herzegovina. However, more relevant measure of solvency, pubic debt to 
government revenues ratio is relatively high (above 100%) in a larger set of countries: 
Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina.  Overall, general government 
deficits are medium to high in Hungary, Slovakia, Croatia, Czech Republic, Lithuania, 
Slovenia and Romania.  
 
Note that nine of the selected countries in our sample are now members of the European 
Union (EU): Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovak Republic 
and very recently Romania and Bulgaria. This will be taken into account in our models. 
 
3. DATA SAMPLE 
 
Annual data on rescheduling event and determinants of rescheduling is collected for  15 EE 
countries over the period 1990-2005. Our study includes countries of Central EE (Hungary, 
Czech Republic, Slovak Republic, Slovenia and Poland), South EE (Croatia, Albania, Bosnia 
and Herzegovina, Serbia, Montenegro, Macedonia, Bulgaria and Romania), Baltic countries 
(Estonia, Latvia, Lethonia) and Russia. The reason for this lies in their common historical 
heritage and initial economic conditions on which they started period of transition in the early 
1990s.  
 
3.1. Defining the Dependent Variable: default or recheduling event 
Previous literature shows that there is no single empirical definition of what should constitute 
a sovereign debt crisis, default or a rescheduling event (see for example Manasse, Roubini 
and Schimmelpfennig (2003), Ciarlone and Trebeschi (2005), Eaton and Gersovitz (1981), 
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Hajivassiliou (1987), Odedokun (1995) and Kraay and Nehru (2004)). Broadly speaking, a 
default is any failure by a debtor to meet its contractual obligations. The main event of 
default is missing a scheduled payment of principal or interest.  
 
In this paper the dependent variable is defined as the ‘total amount of debt rescheduled’ as is 
reported in the World Bank - Global Development Finance 2006 (GDF)5. If there was report 
of rescheduling on any of the component items, we have considered that the country has 
rescheduled.  
 
In the model that we intend to use, the event of weather or not rescheduling took place is 
dichotomous and qualitative variable. Therefore, the dependent variable is a binary variable 
possessing only two possible values or outcomes:   
Rescheduling it  =    year tin debt  its reschedulenot  does isovereign  if            0 year tin debt  its sreschedule isovereign  if            1    (1) 
Table 1 summarizes all the countries included in analysis, the period examined for each 
country and the actual rescheduling observations during the sample periods.  The final sample 
is comprised of  176 observations and 35 rescheduling events.  
- Insert Table 1 – 
 
3.2. Variables used as possible determinants of debt recheduling  
We start our analysis with 40 macroeconomic, financial and political indicators that can 
potentially explain counties' sovereign debt rescheduling probabilities. This large number of 
variables will then be reduced to the significantly smaller number through several 
econometric steps, discussed in Section 3. The variables are divided in nine categories, 
specifically: 1) solvency, 2) liquidity, 3) variables used in currency crisis models, 4) 
macroeconomic variables, 5) external trade ratios 6) public debt ratios, 7) financial variables, 
                                                             
5
 including debt stock rescheduled, interest rescheduled capitalized, interest rescheduled official, interest 
rescheduled private, principal rescheduled official, principal rescheduled private and principal rescheduled. Debt 
from official creditors includes loans from international organizations (such as World Bank, EBRD or other 
multilateral and intergovernmental agencies) and loans from governments (bilateral loans). Debt from private 
creditors include bonds, commercial bank loans from private banks and other private financial institutions and 
other private credits (from manufacturers, exporters, suppliers of goods and bank credits covered by a guarantee 
of an export credit agency) 
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8) past rescheduling record and 9) the political variable proxied by ICRG Index6. The list of 
all variables and the impact that each one is expected to have on the probability of 
rescheduling is shown in Table 2.  
- Insert Table 2- 
The descriptive statistics associated with these variables for countries that have rescheduled 
during the sample period, as well as for those that have not, are presented in Table A1 in 
Appendix 1. 
 
Three main sources of data used to compile the set of variables described in Sections 3.1. and 
3.2. are: IMF’s International Financial Statistics, World Bank’s Global Development Finance 
and World Bank Development Indicators. The political variable, ICRG index, is provided by 
PRS Group. The frequency of all data is annual. To ensure predictive power of our models, 
all potential explanatory variables from Section 3.2. are lagged by one year.  
 
4. EMPIRICAL MODEL SPECIFICATION 
 
Using all 40 variables at the same time, would result in an overly complicated model, with 
many potentially significant coefficients appearing as statistically indistinguishable from 
zero, i.e. multicolinearity and over-fitting of the model may cause biased values of the 
significance test. Therefore, to eliminate less relevant variables, we proceed along a three-
stage strategy. 
 
4.1. Stage 1: Selecting Relevant Variables - Univariate Logit 
 
At the first stage, we run univariate panel logit regressions for each of the 40 variables 
independently from one another. This will enable us to exclude from the final model all the 
variables that turn out to be insignificant in determining whether the sovereign reschedules its 
debt or not. 
 
To define a panel logit model, consider a country i observed over T periods of time, where t = 
1,….,T and i = 1,…,N. For this country there exists an unobservable7 random variable y*it 
                                                             
6
 In ICRG index, the political risk rating contributes 50% of the composite rating, while the financial and 
economic risk ratings each contribute 25%. Each component is assigned a maximum numerical value (risk 
points), with the highest number of points indicating the lowest potential risk for that component and vice versa. 
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indicating latent propensity.  Whilst we do not observe y*it directly, we do observe a binary 
outcome y it  such that yit =  1(y*it >  0) where y it   is termed the indicator function taking the 
value 1 if the condition within parentheses is satisfied, and 0 otherwise. An example of this 
might be the amount of total debt rescheduled (yit), and the capability of the country to pay its 
debts (y*it). y*it is a function of explanatory variable(s) xit, constant unobserved individual 
county effects α i  and random error term uit. The following equation represents the above: 
y*it = αi + 'x it  + uit     (2) 
 yit is a dummy variable defined by: 
  otherwise      0 0 if     1 itit *yy  
For any  , the probability of observing the outcomes ity  is conditional on the values of 
variable itx . For the panel logit model, the probability that a sovereign i will reschedule its 
debt at time t is given as: 
)exp(1
)exp()1(Prob   ititxx  iiitngRescheduli                                  (3) 
Through this procedure, we extracted 17 variables, namely: Lagged Rescheduling Event, 
ICRG index,  Export/GDP, Current Account/GDP, Total Debt/GDP, GDP growth rate, 
Foreign Direct Investment/GDP, General Government Expenditures/GDP, Credits to Private 
Sectors/GDP, Short Term Debt/Total Debt, Inflation Rate, Exchange Rate Devaluation, 
Interest Arrears/Total Debt, Principal Arrears/Total Debt, M2/Reserves, Imports/GDP and 
International Reserves/GDP. However, using 17 variables in the same model can still result 
in biased coefficient and in turn biased interpretation of which variables increase the 
probability of debt recheduling.  
 
4.2. Stage 2:  Selecting Relevant Variables - Principal Component Analysis  
 
In order to eliminate any strong and persistent multicolinearity between 17 explanatory 
variables obtained from the univariate panel logit approach, in this next stage we resort to the 
Principal Component Analysis (PCA). The PCA provides a method for simplification, 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
7
 "latent" variable 
11 
 
combining many correlated variables into a smaller number of underlying factors (Hamilton 
(2004)). More specifically, PCA computes a new set of orthogonal values from a linear 
combination of the explanatory variables. PCA can be defined as: 
                                              nni XXL   ..........11       (4)                 
where 1
1
nn   ; the variance of the equation is maximized and Li the explanatory variable is 
orthogonal.  
 
In order to select how many factors to use, we consider eigenvalues from the PCA. For the 
full set of 17 explanatory variables, it was found that 5 components (factors) have 
eigenvalues greater than 1, accounting for 71.24% of the total variability in the data and are 
therefore regarded as significant for our further analysis. After rotating the factor matrix, 
from the identification of the highest factor loadings for each variable on each factor, we have 
determined the dimension of each of the 5 factors (components) named after the variables 
that dominate in each group:   Factor 1 – Solvency (Trade) Dimension:  Total Debt/GDP, Foreign Direct 
Investment/GDP, Credits to Private Sectors/GDP, Imports/GDP and International 
Reserves/GDP  Factor 2 – Liquidity Dimension: Interest Arrears/Total Debt, Principal Arrears/Total 
Debt and  M2/Reserves  Factor 3 – Currency Crises/Macroeconomic Dimension: Exchange Rate Devaluation 
Inflation Rate and GDP growth rate  Factor 4 – Public Debt Dimension: General Government Expenditures/GDP and Short 
Term Debt/Total Debt  Factor 5 – External Debt Dimension: Current Account/GDP. 
Thus, from each dimension (component), we have selected no more than two to three 
variables (12 in total), according to the highest factor loading, which are sufficient in 
explaining the whole dimension. The results of rotated factor matrix are presented in Table 
A2 in Appendix 2.    
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4.3. Stage 3: Building the Multivartiate Panel Logit Model: Stepwise Gradual Method  
 
In this final stage, we apply the Forward Stepwise Gradual Model Based Procedure for the 
multi-variate panel logit model construction with an aim to develop parsimonious models, i.e. 
models that would have a high degree of correct predictions and low Type I and Type II 
errors8. The reason for this gradual model building is to control for the omitted variables (see 
Roubini, Mannase and Schimmelpfenning (2003) and Ciarlone and Trebeschi (2005) for 
stepwise model building procedure).  
 
Our Forward Stepwise multivariate panel logit regressions indicate that there is persistence in 
significance of three variables, namely: Total debt/GDP, Exports/GDP and Current 
Account/GDP. We refer to those variables as ‘fixed’ variables in further text, as proposed in 
Sala-i-Martin (1997). ‘Fixed’ variables are used as a basis for the models we examine, while 
additional variables to be included in those multivariate logit models are selected using 
forward stepwise procedure. Therefore, we generate two models that we believe are more 
accurate than others:  
1) Model I includes: the ‘Fixed’ variables, Foreign direct investments, General 
Government expenditures, Credits to private sector, Short-term debt and the Lagged 
rescheduling record.  
2) Model II includes: the ‘Fixed’ variables, the Lagged rescheduling record, GDP 
growth, M2/Reserves and ICRG composite index. However, eight of the 15 countries 
analysed joined the EU during the sample period, which may lead to the improvement 
of the debt repayment record of a country. Thus, to test whether EU membership 
influences the probability of debt recheduling, we add an EU dummy variable to 
Model II, taking value of 1 when a country becomes a memeber and zero otherwise, 
creating Model IIa. 
 
Note that the probability of rescheduling in a multivariate panel logit framework is obtained 
in the similar manner as in equation (3):   
                                                             
8
 Type I error occurs when actual defaults/reschedulings are classified by the model as non-
defaults/reschedulings . Type II error occurs when actual non-defaults/reschedulings are classified by the model 
as defaults/reschedulings. The cut-off point for classifying a probability as rescheduling or non-rescheduling is 
determined  by default: cut off point of 0.5 
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)exp(1
)exp()1(Prob   iti itiitngRescheduli xx           (5) 
Where, in the multivariate panel logit model framework,   is a (k x 1) vector of parameters 
associated with the transposed vector of variables itx '  selected for the model. Finally, 
following Hausman test results, we apply random-effect logit model estimation9, indicating 
that state dependence appears to be very important in the case of sovereign debt rescheduling 
(as found in Aylward and Thorne (1998), Hajivassiliou (1989, 1994), McFadden et al. (1985), 
Brewer and Rivoli (1997), Carmen (1992) among many others).  
 
5. RESULTS 
 
The results for Model I, Model II and Model IIa are presented in detail in Table 3. 
- Insert Table 3 – 
All tested variables in Model I are highly statistically significant at 1% and 5% level of 
significance except for the Lagged dependent variable (rescheduling event) that has a p value 
slightly above the 10% significance level and Foreign direct investments that are significant 
at 10%. All significant variables in Model I have the expected sign. Model I and the 
explanatory variables are jointly statistically significant at 5% level as indicated by p-values 
of Wald Chi-squared test. 
 
Since the logit model is non-linear, the coefficients obtained by the Model I do not explain 
the contribution of each variable to the probability of rescheduling, but instead they represent 
odds ratios which are not easily interpreted. Therefore, we calculate the real marginal effects 
that each of the variable has on the dependent variable.  
 
A closer look at the marginal effects for Model I shows significant impact of explanatory 
variables on the probability of debt rescheduling, both ‘fixed’ explanatory variables and  
those less typically found in literature on emerging market debt recheduling probabilities. For 
example, an increase in one unit of the ‘fixed’ variable Total Debt/GDP causes an increase in 
debt rescheduling probability by 2.55%, while a unit increase of Exports/GDP ratio causes 
decrease in sovereign debt rescheduling probability by 7.03%. Increase in a unit of Current 
                                                             
9
 Random effects Panel Logit Model (REM) is appropriate when there are cross sectional differences or 
heterogeneity and this hetereogeneity is assumed to be not correlated with the regressors of the model.  
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Account/GDP ratio causes increase in sovereign debt rescheduling probability by 5.06%. 
This may seem counter intuitive, since it implies that the higher the current account surplus, 
the more likely is that the country will reshedule its debt. However, for transitional 
economies, such as the countries in our sample, current account deficits are associated with 
higher growth and financial integration in the region (see Abiad et. al., 2007), which in turn 
can lead to improvement of debt repayment record of a country. Foreign Direct 
Investment/GDP ratio variable shows the level of openness of the country and is a significant 
indicator of business climate in the country that wants to attract potential investments, so it is 
not a surprise that its unit increase causes decrease in sovereign debt rescheduling probability 
by 9.4%.  Additionally, countries in transition are well known for their high levels of 
government spending, therefore, in our sample, a unit increase of Government 
Expenditure/GDP ratio causes a massive increase in sovereign debt rescheduling probability 
of 19.25%.  
 
Furthermore, in Table 2, we show that impact of Credits to private sector/GDP and Short 
term debt share in total debt  variables on probability of debt rescheduling can be somewhat 
ambiguous. Both of those variables are significant at the 5% level and negatively related to 
probability of debt rescheduling. Specifically, it seems that a country is less likely to 
reschedule if there is a higher percentage of Short term debt in Total debt. In countries in 
transition, given their economic and other uncertainties and risks10, it is not surprising that 
short-term debt would be percieved as less likely to default than the long-term one. In terms 
of Credits to private sector/GDP, it is possible that private sector investments in transition 
economies are perceived to show higher levels of credibility than the public sector. Further, 
this variable can be an indicator of ownership restructuring and potentials for higher future 
GDP growth, which in turn decreases the probability of sovereign debt rescheduling. Thus, 
increase in Credits to private sector can decrease the risk of sovereign debt rescheduling 
probability as a strong indicator of private sector development in transition countries that 
investors take into account when they calculate net present values of their investments.  
 
Model II and its explanatory variables are jointly significant at 1% level. Although majority 
of the variables used in the model are significant, such as the ‘fixed’ variables (at 1% or 5% 
level), GDP growth (at 1% level) and lagged rescheduling event (at 1% level), our findings 
                                                             
10
 For further details see Detragiache and Spilimbergo (2001) 
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show that political factors (ICRG index) and liquidity variable M2/Reserves do not 
significanlty influence debt recheduling in the region.  
 
Marginal effects in Model II show that one additional debt rescheduling event increases the 
probability that the country will reschedule in the future by 3.85%.  A unit increase in Total 
debt/GDP and Current Account/GDP increase the probability of debt rescheduling by 3.79% 
and 9.29% respectively, whereas a unit increase in Export/GDP and GDP growth rate 
decrease the probability of debt rescheduling by 10.29% and 5.54% respectively. Persistently 
high influence of Export/GDP variable in both Model I and Model II can be explained by the 
fact that countries that we are focusing on are mainly small open economies, highly 
influenced by terms of international trade and finances. At the same time, exports are 
generating revenues, GDP growth and represent the drivers of stability of these countries. In 
conclusion, besides the current account and the level of total debt burden, these small open 
economies’ investment opportunities are highly dependent on their past rescheduling records. 
 
One of the results of Model II that we believe requires more attention, is the insignificance of 
political variable, which was found to be important in many previous studies. One reason for 
this could be the decrease of potential political risks and stabilisation in the region. 
Specifically, in the later part of our sample period, most of the countries entered the final 
phase of transition while some of them joined the European Union. To check for the ultimate 
importance of being a member of the European Union (perceived in this context as a political 
factor variable), we extend Model II by includeind an EU dummy variable to create Model 
IIa. The insignificant EU dummy coefficient in Model IIa implies that the EU membership 
does not affect sovereign debt rescheduling probabilities in EE countries during the sample 
period.    
 
Overall, in terms of determinants of debt rescheduling, it turns out that variables which are 
more specific for countries in transition have greater impact on debt rescheduling than 
variables traditionally considered as the most influential ones according to the literature (e.g. 
political factors, reserves to imports, total debt service payment to exports, inflation, 
indicators of exchange rate overvaluation, etc.)  
 
In the search for the most accurate model, in terms of the higher forecasting accuracy and 
lower Type I and type two errors, Model I appears better than Model II and Model IIa in that 
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it has a higher prediction level (81.37% of correct classification) and very low Type II error 
(3.73%). However, the Type I error for Model I is quite high (14.9%). Since for international 
lenders it is potentially more important to correctly classify actual reschedulings (than actual 
non-reschedulings), that is have a lower Type I error, Model II (and IIa) is better in this 
context, generating a very low level of Type I error (3.73%). However, Model II and IIa have 
lower number of total correct predictions (75.78%) compared to Model I, which also implies 
that the Type II error has increased (20.5%). Such a Type II error of Model II (IIa) implies 
that the model is too restrictive, classifying 1/5 of non-rescheduling events as rescheduling. 
Thus applicability of this model is limited only for very risk averse investors. Further, Model 
II can keep many potential investors away from investing, as it overstates the possibility of 
rescheduling. This can decrease the growth possibilities in these small open economies 
slowing the speed of transition and increasing debt burden while waiting for potential 
investors. Therefore, the analysis suggests that in order to control both for the model accuracy 
and the Type I error, investors should find both of these models useful.  
 
6.  CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
This paper provides new empirical evidence about the determinants and importance of 
international and country specific macroeconomic indicators of the sovereign debt 
rescheduling probabilities of the EE countries. During the last decade, the EE countries 
became very attractive European region creating an investment boom. Specifically, the region 
became the largest recipient of net non-FDI flows among all emerging market regions in 
2005.  Developing models that can provide more accurate estimates of debt rescheduling 
probabilities in this region can benefit the investors as well as the host countries.  
 
This study estimates sovereign default/rescheduling probabilities using panel logit models on 
a sample of 15 EE countries over the period 1990-2005. Compared to previous studies 
performed in this area, this paper combines different econometric metodologies to develop 
models with high degree of accuracy.  
 
The findings show that in predicting the debt rescheduling probabilities one should utilise 
both of the two models suggested. Particularly, the models imply that EE countries, which 
want to reduce their probabilities of rescheduling, therefore reducing cost of  borrowing 
and/or improve access to credit, should generally:  
17 
 
1) Control and reduce their General Government Expenditures by restructuring the 
public sector, attract more Foreign Direct Investments and stimulate GDP growth.   
2) Increase their Export revenues by implementing a strategic trade policy in order to 
balance Current Account   
3) Have a good repayment performance by limiting the size of  the external debt 
compared to their GDP and do not default on sovereign debt as a result of 
unwillingness rather than inability to repay. 
Furthermore, even though in the long run EU membership may improve the countries debt 
repayment perfomance and sovereign rating, our findings suggest that this political aspect is 
not significant for the sample period that we analysed.  
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APPENDIX 1 
Table A1: Complete sample of sovereign debt recheduling determinants: Descriptive Statistics 
 All Countries  Countries that have 
rescheduled 
Countries that have not 
rescheduled 
Variable Obs Mean Std.dev
. 
Ob
s 
Mean Std.dev. Ob
s 
Mean Std.dev. 
          
Lagged Rescheduling 176 0.239 0.427 35 0.7157 0.458 126 0.119 0.325 
ICRG Rating Assigned 141 0.507 0.291 27 0.513 0.234 101 0.562 0.276 
Total Debt/GDP 176 0.474 0.251 35 0.581 0.324 126 0.436 0.221 
Total Debt/Exports 169 1.036 0.563 32 1.488 0.755 125 0.919 0.456 
Short-term Debt/Total Debt 176 0.204 0.177 35 0.149 0.167 126 0.217 0.178 
Interest Service due/Exports 169 0.041 0.027 32 0.036 0.019 125 0.0434 0.029 
PNG, total private 
nonguaranteed/Exports 
176 0.196 0.205 35 0.117 0.146 126 0.195 0.195 
PPG, official creditors/Exports 176 0.425 0.480 35 0.852 0.557 126 0.315 0.390 
PPG, total public and publicly 
guaranteed/Exports 
176 0.754 0.630 35 1.365 0.707 126 0.608 0.517 
Debt Service due/Exports 169 0.141 0.103 32 0.077 0.041 125 0.154 0.109 
Reserves/Imports 168 0.035 0.014 31 0.030 0.016 125 0.036 0.012 
Exports/GDP 176 0.431 0.179 35 0.317 0.113 126 0.458 0.180 
Imports/GDP 176 0.509 0.174 35 0.384 0.152 126 0.536 0.166 
Current Account Balance/GDP 173 -0.054 0.064 35 -0.028 0.091 125 -0.057 0.048 
International Reserves/GDP 170 0.156 0.073 31 0.099 0.051 125 0.163 0.069 
Credit to private sector/GDP 176 0.099 0.116 35 0.042 0.049 126 0.101 0.110 
GDP per capita growth 175 0.033 0.058 34 0.020 0.089 126 0.033 0.048 
GDP growth rate 175 0.028 0.051 34 0.012 0.065 126 0.029 0.048 
Exports growth rate  168 0.095 0.140 33 0.072 0.227 120 0.095 0.113 
Inflation rate (consumer prices) 174 0.515 1.774 35 1.328 3.306 124 0.343 1.077 
Inflation rate (GDP deflator) 174 0.432 1.394 34 0.999 2.524 126 0.320 0.943 
Devaluation of Exchange rate 174 -0.116 0.376 35 -0.284 0.534 124 -0.093 0.325 
Interest arrears on LDOD/Exports 176 
 
0.039 
 
0.173 
 
35 
 
0.174 
 
0.356 
 
126 
 
0.005 
 
0.034 
 Principal arrears on 176 0.073 0.267 35 0.302 0.529 126 0.016 0.070
Interest arrears on LDOD/Debt 176 0.018 0.068 35 0.081 0.136 126 0.003 0.012 
Principal arrears on LDOD/Debt 176 0.042 0.116 35 0.170 0.210 126 0.011 0.035 
Domestic Saving Rate 176 0.153 0.131 35 0.123 0.201 126 0.163 0.104 
Government Expenditure/GDP 173 0.179 0.048 34 0.183 0.048 124 0.178 0.049 
M2/Total Reserves 169 0.031 0.021 31 0.042 0.021 124 0.029 0.020 
S&P Emerging Market Index 85 0.195 0.559 6 0.539 1.265 69 0.115 0.471 
Foreign Direct Investments/GDP 176 0.038 0.030 35 0.018 0.024 126 0.043 0.030 
Real interest rate 151 0.037 0.164 29 0.034 0.278 109 0.038 0.131 
Risk Premium on Landing 83 0.073 0.176 15 0.207 0.392 64 0.043 0.030 
Stock Traded Total Value/GDP 134 0.044 0.063 23 0.029 0.045 98 0.045 0.065 
Unemployment  127 0.129 0.060 20 0.141 0.057 103 0.126 0.060 
Reserve/Total Debt 170 0.459 0.384 31 0.263 0.215 125 0.505 0.416 
General government balance/GDP 122 -0.021 0.037 19 -0.032 0.046 98 -0.019 0.034 
Government Revenue/GDP 123 13.380 45.061 19 74.312 82.763 99 0.291 0.112 
Multilateral Debt/Total Debt 176 0.146 0.146 35 0.128 0.153 126 0.149 0.137 
Concessional Debt/Total Debt 176 0.105 0.174 35 0.126 0.191 126 0.099 0.161 
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APENDIX 2 - Principal Component Analyses (PCA) 
Table A2: Rotated Component Analysis Factor Matrix  
Rotated Factor Loadings – Verimax Rotation 
Variable 1 2 3 4 5   Uniqueness 
Dimension 
 
Solvency 
 
Liquidity 
 
Currency 
Crises  
Public Debt 
 
External 
Debt  
 
Lagged rescheduling -0.25901 0.70869* -0.04018 -0.1655 0.41683 0.22793 
ICRG rating -0.422* 0.02938 -0.28118 0.06931 -0.37426 0.59711 
Total debt/GDP 0.63688* 0.43336 -0.26262 0.06086 0.00979 0.33381 
Short-term Debt/Total Debt 0.13345 -0.25657 0.08085 0.79881* -0.09905 0.26191 
Exports/GDP 0.77124* -0.14041 0.00282 0.40539 -0.08846 0.21329 
Imports/GDP 0.74658* -0.18642 0.13958 0.37571 -0.32712 0.14022 
Current Account Balance/GDP -0.28283 0.1515 -0.12902 -0.05042 0.80626* 0.22782 
International Reserves/GDP 0.7009* -0.27745 0.30843 -0.06134 -0.00486 0.33285 
Credit to private sector/GDP 0.68583* -0.12632 0.22248 0.17689 -0.06644 0.42848 
GDP growth rate 0.11705 -0.23265 0.75694* 0.09883 0.17676 0.3182 
Inflation rate (consumer prices) 0.06741 0.00681 -0.79758* -0.10676 0.29335 0.26183 
Devaluation of Exchange rate 0.21231 -0.07999 0.87577* 0.06967 -0.06636 0.17229 
Interest arrears on LDOD/Debt -0.08535 0.88884* -0.17785 0.03769 0.12409 0.15423 
Principal arrears on LDOD/Debt -0.1022 0.84736* -0.00989 -0.14006 -0.06261 0.2479 
Government Expenditure/GDP  0.2096 0.12429 0.12928 0.79534* 0.02363 0.29078 
M2/Total Reserves -0.41073 0.49661* -0.4685 0.05535 -0.1585 0.337 
Foreign Direct Investments/GDP 0.66853* -0.27788 0.20131 -0.06331 -0.29768 0.3427 
* the highest factor loading for each variable 
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Table 1: Sample and Data 
Country 
Period 
examined Rescheduling  
Albania 1993-2005 5 
Bulgaria 1992-2005 5 
Bosnia & Hertzegovina 2000-2005 1 
Czeck Republic 1994-2005 0 
Estonia 1994-2005 0 
Croatia 1994-2005 4 
Hungary 1990-2005 0 
Lithuania 1994-2005 0 
Latvia 1994-2005 0 
Macedonia 1997-2005 3 
Poland 1991-2005 4 
Romania 1991-2005 0 
Russia 1995-2005 10 
Serbia & Montenegro 2001-2005 3 
Slovak Republic 1994-2005 0 
   
Total 1990-2005 35 
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Table 2: Impact of selected variables on the probability of recheduling 
Variables Impact of the increase in value of the 
variable on probability of recheduling 
Positive Negative 
Past rescheduling record:   
Lagged Rescheduling x  
Political Variable:  
ICRG Rating  x 
Solvency variables:  
Total Debt/GDP x  
Total Debt/Exports x  
Interest arrears on LDOD*/Exports x  
Principal arrears on LDOD*/Exports x  
Interest arrears on LDOD*/Debt x  
Principal arrears on LDOD*/Debt x  
Credit to private sector/GDP (a)  x 
Real interest rate on international lending x  
Risk Premium on international landing x  
Exports/GDP  x 
Exports growth rate  x 
Multilateral Debt/Total Debt x  
Concessional Debt/Total Debt x  
Liquidity Variables:  
 Short-term Debt/Total Debt (b) ambiguous ambiguous 
Interest Service due/Exports x  
Debt Service due/Exports x  
PNG**, total private nonguaranteed creditors/Exports x  
PPG***, official creditors/Exports x  
International Reserves/GDP  x 
Reserve/Total Debt  x 
Reserves/Imports  x 
Variable used  in currency crisis models:  
Devaluation of Exchange rate x  
M2/Total Reserves x  
Macroeconomic variables:  
Inflation rate (consumer prices) x  
Inflation rate (GDP deflator) x  
Unemployment x  
Foreign Direct Investments/GDP  x 
GDP per capita growth  x 
GDP growth rate  x 
Domestic Saving Rate  x 
Extrenal trade ratios:   
Current Account Balance/GDP x  
Imports/GDP (c) ambiguous ambiguous 
Public debt ratios:  
Government Expenditure/GDP x  
General government balance/GDP  x 
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Government Revenue/GDP  x 
PPG**, total public and publicly guaranteed debt/Exports x  
Financial variables:  
S&P Emerging Market Index  x 
Stock Traded Total Value/GDP  x 
Notes: 
* Long-term debt outstanding 
**  Private non-guaranteed debt 
*** Public and publicly guaranteed debt 
(a) If the private sector debt increases relative to the overall economy, the probability of 
rescheduling by private banks and companies increases. However, in transition countries, this 
variable can be the indicator of restructuring, development and future potentials for GDP 
growth, which has a negative relationship with the probability of sovereign debt rescheduling. 
Thus, indirectly, we expect this variable to be negatively related to probability of recheduling. 
(b) The impact of this variable is ambiguous since on one hand the higher proportion of short term 
debt in total debt can lead to liquidity risks but on the other, investors can decrease their risk 
investing in country on short terms without being exposed to rescheduling probability in the long 
term period in future. Detragiache and Spilimbergo (2001) stress that in fact countries with 
imminent debt crises can only borrow short-term. 
(c) The higher the imports in relation to the size of the economy this country is more vulnerable to 
foreign shocks, and more likely to external debt rescheduling. Thus the expected coefficient of 
this variable should be positive (Frenkel, 1983). However, it can be debated whether this is 
always true. The higher this ratio, the more open economy is. Thus the country would not be 
willing to risk trade embargo or being ostracised in international economic arena due to default 
on external debt (Odedokun, 1995).  
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Table 3: Estimation Results 
 Dependent variable:  rescheduling Model I Model II Model IIa 
 Independent Variables: Coefficient 
(t-stat) 
Marginal 
Effects % 
Coefficient 
(t-stat) 
Marginal 
Effects % 
Coefficient 
(t-stat) 
Marginal 
Effects % 
(dy/dx)(a) ICRG rating   -.0176371 -.000071        -.0756585 -.0000398 
Lagged rescheduling -1.576432    -.0038672       3.013223 ***     .0385583        2.986011*** .005028 
Total debt/GDP 7.694058 ***    .0255903       9.326913 *** .0379242       9.290832 *** .0048852 
Exports/GDP  -21.16365 ***   -.0703899        -25.3023 ***     -.102882       -25.15219 *** -.0132253 
Current Account Balance/GDP  15.22603 **  .0506415       22.84288 **    .0928816       22.75349 ** .0119641 
GDP growth     -13.61478 * -.0553592       -13.46319 * -.0070791 
Foreign Direct Investments/GDP   -28.29895 *   -.0941218             
Government Expenditure/ GDP 57.87097 ***   .1924778            
Credit to private sector/GDP -19.44009 **   -.0646574              
Short term debt/Total Debt -6.047547 **    -.020114            
M2/Reserves   -24.15499 -.0982168        -23.79202 -.0125102 
EU Dummy     -35.83584 -.0042394 
constant -5.396614**      2.16618     2.176749     
Sigma_u 4.949668       .0009119     .0009119     
Rho .8816129       2.53e-07     2.53e-07     
Log-Likelihood -36.385                -20.783                -20.753                
Wald Chi-Squared   17.40  19.32  18.92   
P-value of Chi2 0.0262  0.0072  0.0153  
Cut off point 0.5  0.5  0.5  
Correct Classifications(%) 81.37  75.78  75.78  
Type I Error (%) 14.91  3.73  3.73  
Type II Error (%) 3.73  20.5  20.5  
No. of Observations 157  120  120  
No. of Countries Analysed 15  12  12  
Period Analysed 1990-2005  1990-2005  1990-2005   
(a) Marginal effects are calculated at the sample means of the independent variables except for the dummy 
lagged rescheduling variable where the marginal effect is calculated for discrete change from 0 to 1 
* significant at 10% level of significance 
** significant at 5% level of significance 
   *** significant at 1% level of significance 
